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India’s New Model Investment Treaty: Fit for Purpose? 
Jarrod Hepburn* and Ridhi Kabra** 
In December 2015, India released a new model bilateral investment treaty. The 
development of such models typically serves four purposes: facilitating 
negotiations with partner states; constituting state practice which may contribute 
to the formation of customary international law; providing interpretive guidance 
to tribunals; and promoting uniformity in international law. However, despite 
some innovative provisions, the new Indian model displays a lack of drafting 
clarity in some respects, and a degree of redundancy in other respects. These 
deficiencies make it doubtful whether the model can achieve any of its purposes. 
India appears to remain committed to (a reformed version of) the investment 
treaty system, not least on behalf of the burgeoning numbers of outward Indian 
investors. The model’s failings are therefore all the more acute, and pose 
challenges for India’s ambitions to play a greater role in the system, while also 
potentially representing a missed opportunity for India’s broader role in the 
‘Asian century’. 
Keywords: bilateral investment treaties, arbitration, general international law, 
counterclaims, expropriation, exhaustion of local remedies, frivolous claims, 
domestic law, treaty conflict, ICSID Convention 
1. Introduction 
Since concluding its first bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with the United Kingdom in 
1994, India has established one of the largest BIT networks of all developing countries.1 
India’s BITs were originally based on a 1993 model, developed from a 1967 OECD 
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1 P Ranjan, ‘India and Bilateral Investment Treaties – A Changing Landscape’ (2014) 29 ICSID 
Rev 419, 421. 
Draft Convention.2 The 1993 model, and the 1994 UK-India BIT, in turn served as a 
basis for the creation of a 2003 model investment treaty.3 Until 2011, when it was held 
liable by an arbitral tribunal for breaching the Australia-India BIT, India paid little 
attention to these treaties. Although the compensation awarded to the investor, White 
Industries Australia Ltd, was relatively small (around $8 million),4 the fact of losing the 
case appeared to wake India up to the importance of its BIT network. 
Consequently, in 2013, India halted all further negotiations of new BITs,5 and 
proceeded to review its 2003 model treaty, producing a new draft model in March 2015 
(Draft Model). Following public consultations and a report by the Law Commission of 
India (LCI),6 the final model was released in December 2015 (Model).7 Throughout 
2016, India then sent unilateral notices of termination to 58 of its 83 BIT partner states,8 
putting terminations into effect from November 2016 onwards.9 
                                                 
2 Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, ‘Transforming 
the International Investment Agreement Regime: The Indian Experience’ (Presentation at 
UNCTAD Expert Meeting, 25 February 2015) <unctad-worldinvestmentforum.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/India_side-event-Wednesday_model-agreements.pdf>.  
3 P Ranjan, ‘Investment Protection and Host State’s Right to Regulate in Indian Model Bilateral 
Investment Treaty 2016: Lessons for Asian Countries’ <ssrn.com/abstract=2888731> 2. 
4 White Industries Australia Ltd v India (UNCITRAL), Final Award, 30 November 2011 
[16.1.1]. 
5 Ranjan (n 1) 421. 
6 LCI, ‘Report No. 260: Analysis of the 2015 Draft Model Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty’ 
(27 August 2015) <lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/Report260.pdf> (Report 260). 
7 Available at <finmin.nic.in/reports/ModelTextIndia_BIT.pdf>. 
8 Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Government of India, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (25 
July 2016) <www.dipp.gov.in/English/questions/25072016/lu1290.pdf>. 
9 The exact date of termination for each BIT varies depending on the notice period required 
under that BIT and the date of notification given by India. The Netherlands-India BIT 
terminated on 30 November 2016, for instance, while the Australia-India BIT terminated 
on 22 March 2017. 
Despite the public consultations, little formal explanatory information on the 
Model is available. Some indication of the intended meaning or effect of the Model’s 
particular provisions might be gauged by comparing it to the Draft Model, in 
conjunction with the LCI’s Report 260: where a suggestion in the report has been 
adopted, the government most likely also agreed with the report’s reasons for the 
suggestion. Other indications of intentions can be gleaned from public statements made 
by the Finance Ministry.10 However, beyond this, observers are left only with the Model 
text itself. 
This Model text has been assessed in the literature to date from various 
perspectives, most notably including whether it provides sufficient protection to foreign 
investors when balanced against the host state’s interests.11 The Model’s removal of the 
“umbrella” clause and the “most-favoured-nation” (MFN) clause, for instance, are 
important elements in such an assessment. This article, meanwhile, pursues a different 
assessment, starting with the reasons why states develop such model treaties. 
Model BITs typically serve several purposes.12 First, they facilitate negotiations 
with partner states on an actual agreement, increasing efficiency and reducing costs for 
                                                 
10 See, eg, Department of Economic Affairs (n 2) (discussing the Draft Model); South Centre, 
‘Approaches by Developing Countries to Reforming Investment Rules; South-South 
Dialogue and Cooperation’, 20 July 2016, 8 (remarks by Indian official CC Sarkar). 
11 See, eg, G Hanessian and K Duggal, ‘The Final 2015 Indian Model BIT: Is This the Change 
the World Wishes to See?’ (2017) 32 ICSID Rev 216; Ranjan (n 3); P Ranjan and P 
Anand, ‘The 2016 Indian Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: A Critical Deconstruction’ 
<ssrn.com/abstract=2946041>; M Thadikkaran, ‘Model Text for the Indian Bilateral 
Investment Treaty: An Analysis’ (2015) 8 NUJS L Rev 31; and the contributions in K 
Singh and B Ilge (eds), Rethinking Bilateral Investment Treaties: Critical Issues and 
Policy Choices (Both Ends/Madhyam/SOMO 2016).  
12 C Brown (ed), Commentaries on Selected Model Investment Treaties (OUP 2013) 2, 11; S 
Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law (CUP 2009) 89–98; P 
each side. According to the Indian government, for instance, the Model is intended to 
serve as the basis for negotiations on new investment treaties to replace those 
terminated throughout 2016.13 (India is not unique in developing a model investment 
treaty to frame discussions with partners; many other states have done so.)14 Second, as 
formal and considered statements of a policy position, model BITs also represent an 
important instance of state practice on foreign investment protection, which over time 
may contribute to the development of customary international law (CIL) in the area. 
Third, model BITs have served as useful interpretive guides for tribunals considering 
the provisions of an actual BIT concluded by the model state.15 Fourth, models promote 
uniformity in the rules governing investment between the model proponent and its 
partners. The United States, for instance, has been highly successful at spreading its 
vision of global investment rules through treaties concluded with several states on the 
basis of its 1994, 2004 and 2012 model BITs.16 Provisions found in US models have 
even been used by US partner states in treaties signed by them with third states.17 
                                                                                                                                               
Dumberry, The Formation and Identification of Rules of Customary International Law in 
International Investment Law (CUP 2016) 251–57. 
13 Press Information Bureau, Government of India, ‘Model Text for the Indian Bilateral 
Investment Treaty’ (16 December 2015) 
<pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=133411>. 
14 Brown (n 12). 
15 Dumberry (n 12) 253–57.  
16 W Alschner and D Skougarevskiy, ‘Mapping the Universe of International Investment 
Agreements’ (2016) 19 JIEL 561; W Alschner, ‘The New Gold Standard? Empirically 
Situating the Trans-Pacific Partnership in the Investment Treaty Universe’ (2016) 17 
JWIT 339. 
17 See, eg, the diffusion of the interpretive annex on expropriation, moving from US treaties to 
many others including India’s agreements with Singapore and China: S Spears, ‘Making 
Way for the Public Interest in International Investment Agreements’ in C Brown and K 
Miles (eds), Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration (CUP 2011) 278. 
But whether a model BIT effectively contributes to these purposes depends on 
several factors, including the clarity of the model’s provisions and their consistency 
with and relationship to the state’s pre-existing obligations in treaty and custom. This 
article aims to assess the extent to which the Indian Model BIT fulfils these general 
purposes of a model investment treaty. In contrast to other commentators, then, the 
article discusses features of the Model that affect this assessment. Section 2 reviews 
novel provisions in the Model through which India appears to adopt a deliberate new 
path, in an effort to shape the global investment treaty regime. The Model’s approach to 
counterclaims is the focus of this section. Section 3, however, considers other 
provisions of the Model whose intended effect is less clear, in the absence of any 
additional clarificatory text or explanatory information. These provisions relate to 
central issues of both substance and procedure: expropriation, the definition of investor 
and investment, exhaustion of local remedies, and dismissal of frivolous claims. Section 
4 studies four further areas of the Model, where – when understood against a 
background of India’s obligations in treaty and CIL – its provisions appear to do 
nothing at all, and are rendered largely redundant. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Innovations in the Model: De Facto Counterclaims 
In several areas, the Model consciously departs from the well-known clauses of a 
typical investment treaty. Some changes, such as on MFN or arbitrator ethics, appear to 
be directly inspired by the outcomes of recent arbitrations involving India.18 Other new 
                                                 
18 The MFN clause was at the heart of India’s loss in the White Industries case: see White 
Industries (n 4) [11.2]. Similarly, the arbitrator conflict provisions may have been drafted 
in response to India’s experiences with arbitrator challenges in the CC/Devas case: 
CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd v India (PCA Case No 2013-09), Decision on the Respondent’s 
provisions relate to transparency and publication of laws,19 but are not justiciable,20 
meaning that their practical impact is likely to be minimal. 
A more interesting departure from previous treaty practice is found in a number 
of Model provisions relating (albeit indirectly) to the issue of counterclaims by states 
against investors. One of the major criticisms of investment treaties has been their 
asymmetrical nature: imposing obligations on states and granting rights to investors, but 
not the reverse.21 The Draft Model sought to remedy this by including extensive 
provisions on investor obligations, and counterclaims by states to enforce these 
obligations.22 The Draft Model’s Articles 9–12 imposed obligations on investors 
relating to anti-corruption, transparency, taxation, labour law, environmental law and 
human rights, while Article 14.11(i) permitted the state to claim compensation for 
breaches of these obligations in an arbitration initiated by the investor. 
While the LCI’s Report 260 suggested some amendments to the investor 
obligations, it did not recommend their removal, or any amendment to Article 14.11 on 
counterclaims. Nevertheless, the Model has removed all binding investor obligations, 
and no longer makes any express provision for counterclaims by the state. Instead, the 
Model includes a clause “reaffirm[ing] and recogniz[ing]” that investors must comply 
                                                                                                                                               
Challenge to the Hon Marc Lalonde as Presiding Arbitrator and Prof Francisco Orrego 
Vicuña as Co-Arbitrator, 30 September 2013.  
19 Article 10. 
20 Article 15.1. 
21 A Newcombe and L Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of 
Treatment (Kluwer 2009) 64. 
22 These provisions appeared to be directly inspired by the 2005 Model Investment Agreement 
produced by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 
<www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment_model_int_agreement.pdf>. Compare Articles 9.1 
and 9.4 of the Draft Model with Articles 13(A) and (B) of the IISD Model. See also 
Report 260 (n 6) [4.1.3]. 
with host state law and must not engage in corrupt activities.23 A separate clause 
requires investors to “endeavour to voluntarily incorporate” corporate social 
responsibility standards into their operations.24 Neither of these clauses is justiciable 
under the Model’s revised approach. 
Despite removing the counterclaims provisions, the Model contains other 
provisions that allow issues relevant to counterclaims to be raised. 
First, and unlike most other investment treaties,25 the Model explicitly requires 
investments to comply with domestic law throughout their operation. Article 1.4 defines 
“investment” as an enterprise “operated…in accordance with the law of the [host 
state]”. Debate over an investor’s compliance with the full range of domestic legal 
obligations is thus likely to form part of a state’s jurisdictional objections, rather than 
appearing as a counterclaim addressed only after the merits of the investor’s claim. 
Shifting such arguments to the jurisdictional stage not only gives them greater 
prominence in the proceedings, but also has the effect of dismissing investors’ claims 
entirely following a sufficiently serious breach of local law. 
Second, the Model includes a footnote that may re-introduce some 
counterclaims by the back door. When calculating damages, Article 26.3 provides that 
tribunals “shall … reduce the damages to take into account … mitigating factors”. In a 
footnote to this clause, the Model specifies that mitigating factors “can include … any 
unremedied harm or damage that the investor has caused to the environment or local 
                                                 
23 Article 11. 
24 Article 12.  
25 Other treaties only require investments to comply with domestic law at the time of their 
establishment in the host state. See J Hepburn, ‘In Accordance with Which Host State 
Laws? Restoring the “Defence” of Investor Illegality in Investment Arbitration’ (2014) 5 
JIDS 531. 
community”. The Model appears to require tribunals to consider mitigating factors, but 
also gives tribunals wide discretion in determining what counts as a mitigating factor. 
Presumably, this discretion would be primarily guided by parties’ arguments. The state 
could thus claim that the investor caused environmental harm, and the tribunal would be 
likely to assess the substance of this claim. Notably, the “environmental harm” 
mitigating factor in Article 26.3 appears to entail a purely factual inquiry, asking 
whether any harm exists and whether it was caused by the investor. It does not appear to 
entail consideration of whether the investor breached any legal obligation in causing the 
environmental harm. If the investor has caused environmental harm, it is likely that this 
will have breached a domestic legal obligation, meaning that the investment will not 
have been “operated … in accordance with the law of the [host state]”, and will not be 
protected by the treaty at all. This might make the reference to environmental harm in 
Article 26.3 otiose. However, the footnote’s factual inquiry may still be useful in states 
that do not have developed domestic regimes of environmental law, and where the 
investor is under no legal obligation to avoid causing environmental harm. Article 26.3 
thus gives tribunals the power to condemn investors for environmental misconduct 
despite the absence of any legal duty to behave responsibly. In this sense, Article 26.3 
serves as a meaningful counterclaims process for states, adding some teeth to the purely 
hortatory language of provisions such as Article 12 on corporate social responsibility. 
Third, Article 26.3’s footnote also includes the mitigating factor of “other 
relevant considerations regarding the need to balance public interest and the interests of 
the investor”. Assuming again that any actual illegalities in the investment’s operation 
will have been addressed at the jurisdictional stage, one such consideration could be the 
investor’s efforts to comply with the “internationally recognized standards of corporate 
social responsibility” acknowledged in Article 12. This could also effectively allow for 
a counterclaim by the state, albeit only to set-off against any damages owed. 
These de facto counterclaims provisions appear to be a conscious effort to 
establish new rules better suited to the nature of contemporary investor-state claims. 
Article 1.4 on domestic law compliance is effectively a manifestation of the doctrine of 
“clean hands”, but whether this doctrine actually constitutes part of general international 
law is contested.26 Article 1.4 may thus constitute a deliberate divergence from general 
international law in this investor-state context. Meanwhile, Article 26.3’s direction to 
consider mitigating factors in calculating damages might be viewed as an exercise of 
equity, which has a firmer ground as a general principle of law, although rarely 
applied.27 In some circumstances,28 the mitigating factors might also represent instances 
of the claimant’s contribution to its own injury, recognized as a customary principle 
limiting reparations.29 More likely, though, the Model’s provisions on mitigating factors 
represent an intentional move to establish lex specialis principles of reparations that will 
                                                 
26 In favour, see eg P Dumberry, ‘State of Confusion: The Doctrine of “Clean Hands” in 
Investment Arbitration After the Yukos Awards’ (2016) 17 JWIT 229. Against, see eg 
Yukos Universal Ltd v Russia (UNCITRAL), PCA Case No AA 228, Final Award, 18 July 
2014 [1358]–[1359]. Others conclude that ‘[l]earned opinion is divided’: S Schwebel, 
‘Clean Hands, Principle’, Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (March 
2013).  
27 B Sabahi, Compensation and Restitution in Investor-State Arbitration (OUP 2011) 186. 
28 Such as, perhaps, where environmental harm triggered the state’s intervention against an 
investment. 
29 International Law Commission, ‘Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts’ in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Volume II, UN 
Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1, Article 39. 
prevail over general international law,30 again perhaps reflecting the particular investor-
state context.31 
3. Textual Silences and Drafting Ambiguity: Model or Muddle? 
Elsewhere in the Model, India has forged other new paths, apparently adopting a novel 
approach to investment protection with potentially widespread ramifications. However, 
in these areas of expropriation, the definition of investor and investment, exhaustion of 
local remedies and dismissal of frivolous claims, a closer analysis reveals that the 
drafting and the intentions behind it are somewhat confused. 
3.1 Discriminatory expropriation 
The Model’s Article 5 makes state expropriation of foreign property subject to three of 
the usual conditions for lawfulness: a public purpose, compliance with due process of 
law, and payment of compensation. A fourth condition, non-discrimination, is however 
omitted. Investment treaties rarely exclude the condition of non-discrimination in their 
provision on expropriation,32 particularly since the condition forms part of CIL on 
expropriation.33 The omission means that an expropriation will not breach Article 5 
even if it is deliberately targeted at investments owned by (for instance) a particular 
                                                 
30 ibid Article 55. 
31 Writers have questioned whether standard CIL principles on reparations are appropriate for 
investor-state claims: see, eg, R Goodman and Y Parkhomenko, ‘Does the Chorzow 
Factory Standard Apply in Investment Arbitration? A Contextual Reappraisal’ (2017) 
ICSID Rev (forthcoming). 
32 A Reinisch, ‘Legality of Expropriations’ in A Reinisch (ed), Standards of Investment 
Protection (OUP 2008) 186. None of the model BITs reviewed in Brown (n 12) omits the 
non-discrimination condition. 
33 Reinisch (n 32). 
nationality or racial, religious or ethnic group.34 
Certainly, the other conditions for lawful expropriation in the Model may offset 
the failure to include the non-discrimination condition. For instance, although tribunals 
typically afford a large degree of deference to states in determining which actions fulfil 
their public purposes,35 a tribunal could perhaps scrutinise this more closely for 
measures targeted at a particular racial group. Similarly, discriminatory measures might 
breach the condition of according due process of law. 
Furthermore, provisions in the Model other than on expropriation may capture 
discriminatory measures. Article 4 guaranteeing national treatment, for instance, will 
capture measures taken on grounds of foreign nationality. Article 3.1 which outlaws 
“measures which constitute a violation of customary international law through … 
targeted discrimination on manifestly unjustified grounds, such as gender, race or 
religious belief”, will protect investors against discriminatory takings, assuming that 
such discrimination is in fact prohibited by CIL.36 
Nevertheless, the failure to include the non-discrimination condition curiously 
restricts the Model’s scope for expropriation claims, compared to other typical BITs and 
to CIL. It is unclear whether this divergence is a simple oversight in the Model, or a 
deliberate omission to be accorded some real meaning. The Model might generally have 
the admirable aim of preserving “policy space” for legitimate state interests,37 but it is 
difficult to imagine why it should preserve space to engage in discriminatory 
expropriations. 
                                                 
34 Thadikkaran (n 11) 38. 
35 UNCTAD, Expropriation (UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/7, July 2012) 32. 
36 See the discussion in M Paparinskis, The International Minimum Standard and Fair and 
Equitable Treatment (OUP 2013) 245–47. 
37 South Centre (n 2). 
3.2 Definition of investor and investment 
As widely observed by commentators,38 the Model takes a new approach to the 
definition of investment, shifting from the commonly-used asset-based definition to an 
enterprise-based definition. Under the Model, an investment must be a company 
registered in the host state and ultimately owned by an individual of home state 
nationality or by a company registered in the home state and having “substantial 
business activities” there. Either that individual or that company must normally be the 
investor-claimant. The Model does allow intermediary “shell” or holding companies (of 
home state nationality) to bring claims, but requires them to be “directly or indirectly” 
owned or controlled by a home state national or a company with home state substantial 
business activities. The inclusion of the word “indirectly” in Article 1.5(b) appears to 
allow the presence of a third-country company somewhere in the chain of ownership 
above the investor-claimant. However, to avoid the risk of invocation of the Model’s 
denial of benefits clause in Article 35, ultimate home state ownership or control must 
still be shown.39 Through the combined effect of Articles 1.4, 1.5 and 35, the Model 
imposes a very strict connection between the claimant and the home state. 
The Model’s shift to an enterprise-based definition has left the question of 
minority shareholder investors unclear. Traditional BITs usually include shares in the 
                                                 
38 See, eg, Hanessian and Duggal (n 11) 217–18. 
39 Tribunals interpreting denial of benefits clauses usually focus on the investor’s ultimate 
ownership: AMTO v Ukraine (SCC Case No 080/2005), Final Award, 26 March 2008 
[67]; Ulysseas v Ecuador (UNCITRAL), Interim Award, 28 September 2010 [170]. 
However, the presence of a third-country company anywhere in the chain of ownership 
might enable the state to invoke denial of benefits, even with ultimate home state 
ownership or control: see Pac Rim Cayman LLC v El Salvador (ICSID Case No 
ARB/09/12), Decision on the Respondent’s Jurisdictional Objections, 1 June 2012 [4.79]–
[4.82]. 
definition of investment.40 Consequently, even investors with minority stakes in local 
investment vehicles have managed to bring claims.41 While tribunals have admitted the 
need to establish a cut-off point of minimum shareholding beyond which minority 
shareholders’ claims would not be permissible (being only remotely connected to the 
affected company),42 no claim by a minority shareholder has yet been denied on this 
ground. 
One Indian official has contrasted the Model with other treaties which protect 
“all kinds of indirect and minority shareholders”, perhaps indicating India’s intention to 
exclude such claimants.43 However, the Model appears to contemplate the possibility 
that an investor might hold less than 50% of the enterprise that represents the 
investment. First, the definition of “enterprise” in Article 1.3 includes joint ventures, 
which are necessarily constituted by more than one entity. Second, while the Draft 
Model defined ownership as a stake of more than 50% in a company, this was removed 
in the Model following criticism in Report 260.44 
                                                 
40 D Gaukrodger, ‘Investment Treaties and Shareholder Claims: Analysis of Treaty Practice’ 
(OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2014/03) 
<www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2014-3.pdf>. 
41 See, eg, CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentina (ICSID Case No ARB/01/8), Decision 
of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 17 July 2003 [47]–[65]. 
42 Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets LP v Argentina (ICSID Case No ARB/01/3), 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 January 2004 [52]. 
43 South Centre (n 2) [54]. 
44 Report 260 observed that it was anyway illegal for foreigners to own more than 50% of an 
Indian company, making the draft Model’s definition meaningless: (n 6) [2.2.3]. However, 
more recent reforms have removed this limit in certain sectors: BBC News, ‘India 
Overhauls Foreign Ownership Rules’ (20 June 2016) <www.bbc.com/news/business-
36575755>. 
Even if an investment must be wholly-owned by the investor, the Model 
includes the enterprise’s assets, including “shares … in another enterprise”,45 as part of 
the investment. There is no stated ownership threshold on these shares, suggesting that 
the Model would protect an investor’s minority stake in a host state company, as long as 
that stake is held through another wholly-owned host state company (the investment). 
However, this conclusion might be affected by the Model’s express exclusion of 
“portfolio investments … in another enterprise” from the protected assets.46 Although 
“portfolio investment” is not defined in the Model, it might be taken to be contrasted 
with “shares” on the grounds that the former does not grant rights of managerial control 
in a company.47 A tribunal might also draw from external definitions of “portfolio 
investment”, such as the IMF’s indication that the term refers to shareholdings of less 
than 10%.48 Thus, there may be a minimum threshold on a minority shareholding that 
could be protected via a wholly-owned host state company. 
The Model’s failure to clarify the position of minority shareholders is 
unfortunate, particularly since foreign investors in India cannot hold majority stakes in 
local enterprises in many sectors.49 While a desire to curb treaty-shopping and parallel 
                                                 
45 Strangely, under Article 1.3, an enterprise’s assets can also include ‘shares … of the 
enterprise’. Since this is distinguished from ‘shares … in another enterprise’, it appears to 
mean ‘shares in the enterprise itself’. However, in many jurisdictions, including India, it is 
illegal for companies to own shares in themselves: see Trevor v Whitworth (1887) 12 App 
Cas 409; Companies Act 2013 ss67–68 (India); Corporations Act 2011 s259A (Australia). 
The reference to ‘shares … of the enterprise’ is therefore probably meaningless. 
46 Article 1.4(i). 
47 See also R Dolzer and C Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2nd edn, OUP 
2012) 60.  
48 International Monetary Fund, ‘Balance of Payments and International Investment Position 
Manual’ <www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bop/2007/pdf/chap6.pdf>. 
49 See n 44. 
claims appears to have been central to the Model’s definitions and denial of benefits 
clause, similar concerns over multiple claims from minority shareholders have strangely 
been left unaddressed.50 
3.3 Exhaustion of local remedies 
Exhaustion of local remedies (ELR) is a “well-established rule of customary 
international law”51 that renders a claim before an international court inadmissible 
unless redress has been first sought in the domestic courts of the respondent state.52 
First applied in the context of diplomatic protection,53 it has since found its way into 
international human rights law as well.54 In investment arbitration, however, very few 
investment treaties require full ELR before commencing arbitration.55 Some treaties 
require claimants to pursue local remedies for a specified time-period, usually for a 
“reasonable time” or for no more than two years.56 The Model diverges from this 
practice by imposing a requirement to pursue local remedies for “at least a period of 
five years” before turning to international arbitration.57 Although a partial, time-limited 
                                                 
50 The undesirable consequences of such claims have been well recognized: see, eg, C 
McLachlan, L Shore and M Weiniger, International Investment Arbitration: Substantive 
Principles (OUP 2007) ch 4.  
51 Interhandel (Switzerland v USA) (Preliminary Objections) [1959] ICJ Rep 6, 27; Elettronica 
Sicula SpA (ELSI) (USA v Italy) [1989] ICJ Rep 15 [50]. 
52 ILC (n 29) Article 44(b). 
53 C Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law (CUP 2004) 3.  
54 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 35; American Convention on Human Rights, 
Art 46(1)(a); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art 41(1)(c).  
55 M Brauch, ‘Exhaustion of Local Remedies in International Investment Law’ (IISD Best 
Practices Series, January 2017) <www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/best-
practices-exhaustion-local-remedies-law-investment-en.pdf> 7.  
56 ibid 9–11. 
57 Article 15.2. 
ELR requirement (as in the Model) is not the same as the customary obligation of full 
exhaustion,58 it raises several similar issues discussed below, relating to the nature of 
the remedies that must be pursued, the operation of the “futility” exception, the relation 
to “fork-in-the-road” clauses, and the interaction with waiver clauses. The Model’s 
wording leaves all of these issues unclear to different degrees. 
First, the Model’s Article 15.1 lays down the rule: an “investor must first submit 
its claim before the relevant domestic courts or administrative bodies” of the host state. 
However, the Model does not clarify the nature of administrative bodies to which the 
claims must be submitted. In international law, administrative remedies have been 
subject to two opinions. On one more expansive view, administrative remedies can 
include all remedies available through the executive branch of a government, whether 
binding or not.59 More recently, administrative bodies have been understood to mean 
only those bodies that have a judicial nature and are capable of delivering a binding 
decision.60 Although the Model lacks a definition of “administrative bodies”, the 
definition of “law” in Article 1.6 encompasses all decisions by “administrative 
institutions having the force of law”. This might indicate India’s intention to subscribe 
                                                 
58 See Ambiente Ufficio SPA v Argentina (ICSID Case No ARB/08/9), Decision on Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility, 8 February 2013 [601]–[602]; Brauch (n 55) 2. Recent media 
discussion of the Indian Model has confused a requirement of full exhaustion with the 
actual requirement of partial, time-limited exhaustion: see J Hepburn, ‘Indian BIT 
Negotiator Clarifies Country’s Stance on Exhaustion of Remedies, and Offers Update on 
Status of Country’s Revamp of Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (Investment Arbitration 
Reporter, 31 March 2017) <tinyurl.com/mqgnaew>. 
59 L Sohn and R Baxter, Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to 
Aliens (1961) 164; Phosphates in Morocco (Italy v France) (Preliminary Objections) PCIJ 
Series A/B No 74, 28. 
60 ILC, ‘Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with commentaries’ in Yearbook of the ILC, 
2006, Volume II, A/CN.4/SER.A/2006/Add.1 (Part 2), commentary to Article 39 [5].  
to an expanded view of administrative bodies that includes all such bodies, irrespective 
of their ability to render a binding decision. 
Second, as well as limiting the ELR requirement to five years, the Model 
includes an explicit “futility” exception, which excuses an investor from pursuing local 
remedies if “there are no available domestic legal remedies capable of reasonably 
providing any relief”.61 This exception mirrors the equivalent futility exception to the 
customary ELR requirement.62 There is relative agreement on certain ways of satisfying 
this exception. Considerations such as low possibility of success or difficulty in filing 
appeals, for instance, are not sufficient.63 Conversely, ELR can be bypassed if the host 
State’s Supreme Court decisions prevent its lower courts from deciding the subject of 
the investor’s complaint.64 However, in relation to time-limited clauses, there is less 
agreement on whether the futility exception is satisfied where the dispute is unlikely to 
be resolved in domestic courts within the timeframe specified. Given that India’s legal 
system is notoriously slow,65 investors might be likely to plead this element of the 
futility exception in every claim against India, contending that the domestic system is 
not capable of reasonably providing any relief within five years. Whether such a claim 
would succeed to bypass the local remedies requirement depends on the intended 
interpretation of the exception. 
                                                 
61 Article 15.1. 
62 ILC (n 60), Article 15(a). 
63 ibid, commentary to Article 15(a) [4].  
64 See Ambiente, where decisions of the Argentinian Supreme Court rendered matters associated 
with Argentina’s sovereign debt restructuring non-justiciable. Ambiente (n 58) [616]–
[620]. The test is incorporated from ILC (n 60), Article 15(a).  
65 Vidhi Doshi, ‘India’s Long Wait for Justice: 27m Court Cases Trapped in Legal Logjam’ 
(The Guardian, 6 May 2016) <www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/05/indias-long-
wait-for-justice-27-million-court-cases-trapped-in-a-legal-logjam>. 
Investment tribunals are known to adopt differing approaches to this question. 
Some tribunals, citing principles of “fairness and efficiency”, have allowed investors to 
bypass a time-limited ELR requirement if domestic courts cannot reach a final decision 
on substance within the time period.66 Others acknowledge that time-bound ELR 
provisions do not require the final disposal of the domestic case, but merely seek to give 
domestic courts the opportunity to render a first-instance judgment.67 The Model’s use 
of the phrases “reasonably” and “any relief”, coupled with the unprecedented inclusion 
of the 5-year time-period, is likely motivated by the problems arising from the former 
interpretive approach. Studies suggest that Indian High Courts take just over three years 
on average to issue judgments.68 If the former interpretation were to apply, investors 
would succeed in bypassing local remedies for most investment claims against India, as 
a final disposal of a case, after exhausting all avenues of appeal, within 5 years is 
unlikely for complex investment disputes.69 The more obvious interpretation is the latter 
– that the Model seeks to offer domestic courts the opportunity to resolve the dispute by 
                                                 
66 Abaclat v Argentina (ICSID Case No ARB/07/5), Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 
4 August 2011 [583]; Urbaser v Argentina (ICSID Case No ARB/07/26), Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 19 December 2012 [194], [202]–[203]. 
67 Ambiente (n 58) [604]–[605]. 
68 P Thakur, ‘HCs Taking 3 Years on Average to Decide Cases: Study’ (The Times of India, 22 
March 2016) <timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/HCs-taking-3-years-on-average-to-
decide-cases-Study/articleshow/51503719.cms>. Similarly, average times to enforce 
contracts in Indian courts have been calculated as 1420 days (3.9 years): World Bank, 
Doing Business 2017: Equal Opportunity for All (World Bank 2017) 
<www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2017>. 
69 White Industries (n 4) was based on a nine-year delay by Indian courts to decide an 
application for set-aside of an ICC award.  
delivering a first-instance judgment,70 with a possibility of a decision on appeal, for 
which the current 5-year time period seems sufficient.71 
Third, a strange element of the Model’s ELR clause is its provision that “the 
investor shall not assert that the obligation to exhaust local remedies does not apply or 
has been met on the basis that the claim under this Treaty is by a different party or in 
respect of a different cause of action”.72 This provision appears to be a reference to 
situations such as in CMS v Argentina.73 In that case, the investor’s local subsidiary had 
commenced domestic court proceedings before the investor launched its BIT arbitration. 
However, the relevant BIT contained a “fork-in-the-road” clause, preventing arbitration 
from proceeding if the investor had already taken the claim to local courts. Despite this, 
the tribunal allowed the arbitration to proceed on the grounds that the domestic and 
international claims were technically brought by different parties and were based on 
different causes of action. 
While apparently aimed at preventing such situations, this provision confuses 
fork-in-the-road clauses with ELR clauses. The issues in the CMS case simply do not 
arise in relation to ELR requirements. An investor under the Model is highly likely to 
argue that it has met the ELR requirement by virtue of its subsidiary’s local claims 
and/or by pursuing local remedies under domestic law causes of action; it makes no 
                                                 
70 Interhandel (n 51) 27; Ambiente (n 58) [605].  
71 If full ELR were nevertheless achieved within five years, the natural interpretation of Article 
15.2 is that its requirements would be taken to be satisfied when the final remedy (eg, a 
Supreme Court ruling) was issued. The investor would then be required to institute 
arbitration within one year of this date, under Article 15.5(ii). cf Hanessian and Duggal (n 
11) 222–23. 
72 Article 15.1, second paragraph. 
73 Other commentators have also viewed it this way: Hanessian and Duggal (n 11) 221; Ranjan 
and Anand (n 11) 42. 
sense for the Model to prevent an investor from arguing this. It is possible that the 
provision intends to force the foreign investor specifically, not its locally-established 
enterprise, to bring the domestic claims, if India means to impose an exceedingly strict 
ELR requirement. But given that the Model otherwise treats the investor and its 
investment almost as a unit, including in Article 15.1’s futility exception, this 
interpretation is highly unlikely. More sensible, at least to protect Indian outbound 
investors, might be a provision preventing host states from arguing that the ELR 
requirement has not been met just because a specific allegation of BIT breach was not 
brought to local courts,74 or because a local subsidiary, rather than the investor, brought 
the domestic claims. As currently phrased, however, the Model’s provision is inutile. 
Fourth, the Model’s waiver clause also raises questions, although they are more 
easily resolved. Article 15.5(iii)–(iv) require that an investor and, where relevant, its 
enterprise waive their right to “initiate or continue” domestic proceedings before 
submitting a claim to arbitration. Together with Article 15.1, the Model thus appears 
both to require investors to initiate domestic proceedings and to waive their right to do 
so. To resolve this apparent contradiction, might it be argued that the waiver overrides 
the ELR requirement? 
                                                 
74 The ICJ in ELSI observed that the claimant is not required to present its claim to domestic 
courts with arguments suited to an international tribunal; instead, ‘it is sufficient if the 
essence of the claim has been brought before the competent [domestic] tribunals’: ELSI (n 
51) [59]. Article 15.1 already confirms this by requiring investors to submit domestic 
claims only ‘in respect of the same measure or similar factual matters’ for which a BIT 
breach is claimed. 
The interaction between waiver and ELR requirements has not always been 
clear.75 Waiver provisions akin to the Model were first introduced in NAFTA,76 to 
prohibit investors from taking a “U-turn” towards domestic remedies after initiating 
arbitration.77 NAFTA tribunals have clarified that these waiver provisions become 
applicable only after investors have sought recourse to arbitration. Prior to initiating 
arbitration, investors under NAFTA are entitled to initiate or continue domestic 
proceedings, despite a treaty requirement to waive recourse to domestic remedies.78 The 
Model’s waiver provision can be read similarly: it applies only after the ELR obligation 
has been met, and it then stops an investor from maintaining simultaneous proceedings 
before a national court and an arbitral tribunal.79 
3.4 Dismissal of frivolous claims 
Article 21 adopts an expedited procedure for resolving a State’s preliminary objections, 
by directing tribunals to decide, within 150 days of receiving a State’s request, any 
preliminary objection that an investor’s claim is “(a) not within the scope of the 
                                                 
75 See the NAFTA jurisprudence discussed in M Kinnear, A Bjorklund and J Hannaford, 
Investment Disputes under NAFTA: An Annotated Guide to NAFTA Chapter 11 (Kluwer 
2006), Article 1121.  
76 NAFTA, Article 1121(1)(b). See also: Canadian Model FIPA, Article 26(1)(e); US Model 
BIT (2012), Article 26(2)(b).  
77 L Kaplan and J Sharpe in Brown (n 12) 829.  
78 Waste Management v Mexico (ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/3), Mexico’s Preliminary 
Objection concerning the Previous Proceedings: Decision of the Tribunal, 26 June 2002 
[30]; B Klafter, ‘International Commercial Arbitration as Appellate Review: NAFTA’s 
Chapter 11, Exhaustion of Local Remedies and Res Judicata’, (2006) 12 UC Davis J Int’l 
L & Pol’y 409, 415.  
79 Waste Management (n 78) [31]. Nevertheless, even on this interpretation, Article 15.5’s 
reference to waiving rights to ‘initiate’ domestic proceedings will have limited utility, 
since domestic proceedings were necessarily initiated five years earlier.  
Tribunal’s jurisdiction, or (b) manifestly without legal merit or unfounded as a matter of 
law”.80 This drafting is curious; it seems to have borrowed from, and combined, 
standards available in other agreements for dismissing certain preliminary questions.81 
In doing so, the Model has potentially created interpretative challenges. 
First, the Model has not explained whether there is a difference in the meaning 
of the phrases “manifestly without legal merit” and “unfounded as a matter of law”. The 
former, having its genesis in ICSID Arbitration Rule 41(5), is understood to refer to 
legal allegations that are frivolous or patently unmeritorious.82 The latter has been used 
in the CETA and the EU-Singapore FTA to refer to claims that, as a matter of law, are 
not claims “for which an award in favour of the claimant may be made”.83 In the past, 
investor-claimants have attempted to oppose a tribunal’s jurisdiction to conduct an 
expedited review, on the grounds that claims for which an award in favour of the 
claimant cannot be made as a matter of law are limited to “frivolous claims”. Rejecting 
such arguments, tribunals have interpreted objections on this ground to have a broader 
scope, covering not just frivolous claims but also claims that are legally unsustainable.84 
Article 21 fails to take note of this distinction, or to prevent overlaps. Instead, by 
                                                 
80 Articles 21.1 and 21.4. 
81 CAFTA-DR, Article 10.20.4; CETA, Articles 8.32–8.33; EU-Singapore FTA, Articles 9.20–
9.21; ICSID Arbitration Rules, Article 41(5).    
82 Trans-Global Petroleum v Jordan (ICSID Case No ARB/07/25), The Tribunal’s Decision on 
the Respondent’s Objection under Rule 41(5) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, 12 May 
2008 [78].  
83 CETA, Article 8.33; EU-Singapore FTA, Article 9.21. This phrase is, in turn, borrowed from 
the CAFTA-DR, Article 10.20.4. 
84 Pac Rim (n 39), Decision on the Respondent’s Preliminary Objections under CAFTA Articles 
10.20.4 and 10.20.5, 2 August 2010 [108]; Renco Group v Peru (ICSID Case No 
UNCT/13/1), Decision as to the Scope of the Respondent’s Preliminary Objections under 
Article 10.20.4, 18 December 2014 [185]. 
clubbing the two phrases together into a single sub-category, it seems to use them 
interchangeably. This is regrettable, as the exact scope of the two phrases affects the 
questions that a tribunal can determine under Article 21’s expedited procedure. 
Second, the Model does not clarify the extent to which objections concerning the 
scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction can be made under Article 21.1(a). Ostensibly, the 
provision covers any kind of jurisdictional challenge. However, Article 21 is titled 
“Dismissal of Frivolous Claims”. If the interpretive rule that the ambit of a provision is 
defined by its title85 were to be followed, presumably only those jurisdictional 
challenges that concern the frivolity of an investor’s claim will be covered under Article 
21. To date, provisions similar to Article 21 have not made a specific reference to 
jurisdictional objections. 
The Model does appear to envisage two different categories of jurisdictional 
objection. The chapeau of Article 21.1 preserves a tribunal’s right to address “other 
objections”,86 while the timetabling provision in Article 21.3 requires tribunals to 
“establish a schedule for considering the objection consistent with any schedule it has 
established for considering any other preliminary question”.87 Furthermore, the waiver 
provision in Article 21.5 provides that a respondent is not assumed to have waived 
competence-related objections merely because that objection was not raised under the 
Article 21 procedure. These provisions might suggest that the scope of Article 21.1(a) is 
limited to objections that the claim is frivolous on jurisdictional grounds, excluding 
jurisdictional objections that require more serious consideration. 
                                                 
85 R Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2nd ed, OUP 2015) 200; Plama v Bulgaria (ICSID Case 
ARB/03/24), Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 February 2005 [147].  
86 Renco (n 84) [191].  
87 ibid [200].  
This view is further supported by the fact that, under Article 21.3, tribunals are 
required to assume the claimant’s factual allegations to be true; and that, under Article 
21.4, objections raised under Article 21.1(a) have to be resolved on an expedited basis 
within 150 days. Combined, these provisions indicate that under Article 21 a tribunal is 
likely to entertain only those jurisdictional objections that do not involve any serious 
legal or factual analysis and can therefore be resolved on a summary basis. In fact, 
previous tribunals have refused to entertain objections that raise complex legal and 
factual issues in a summary proceeding.88 If this was indeed India’s intention, it would 
have done better to clarify this by perhaps stating that, under Article 21.1(a), a 
respondent state may object that an investor’s claim is “manifestly not within the scope 
of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction”. India’s failure to do so may put tribunals under 
additional pressure, forcing them to engage in such an interpretative exercise within the 
already strict 150-day time period for review of Article 21 frivolous claims. 
4. Redundancy in Light of Customary and Treaty Obligations 
Section 2 discussed certain of the Model’s actual innovations, while Section 3 discussed 
some apparent innovations that, on closer examination, are weakened by persistent 
ambiguity on key issues. Nevertheless, these provisions can at least be understood with 
respect to the international law background. This section discusses other provisions of 
the Model which appear to do nothing at all, and are simply redundant when seen in 
light of India’s existing customary and treaty obligations. 
                                                 
88 Brandes Investment Partners v Venezuela (ICSID Case No ARB/08/3) Decision on the 
Respondent’s Objection under Article 41(5) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, 2 February 
2009 [71]; PNG Sustainable Development v Papua New Guinea (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/13/33) Decision on Respondent’s Objections under Rule 41(5), 28 October 
2014 [92]–[99]. 
4.1 Interaction with domestic law 
The Model shows a refreshing acceptance that interaction with domestic law will be 
inescapably relevant to investment treaty claims despite their international law context. 
Unlike many investment treaties, the Model’s applicable law clause in Article 23.3 
explicitly acknowledges that tribunals may apply host state law “for matters relating to 
domestic law”. However, this interaction is muddied by Article 13.5(i), which states 
that tribunals “shall not have the jurisdiction to review the merits of a decision made by 
a judicial authority of the Parties”. 
On its face, the reference to “merits” in Article 13.5(i) is unclear. It may be 
taken to refer to the merits, tested against international law, of a local court’s decision 
on a matter of domestic law. But, if tribunals were barred from reviewing domestic 
decisions against international legal standards, denial of justice claims under Article 
3.1(i) would be impossible. If interpreted this way, Article 13.5(i) would implausibly 
prevent all claims of treaty breach in relation to domestic judicial decisions. The more 
obvious interpretation, likely motivated by the desire to “ensure that the tribunal does 
not sit on appeal over the decisions of Indian Courts”,89 is that the clause prevents 
tribunals from questioning the correctness of a domestic court’s decision on domestic 
law.90 NAFTA tribunals have expressed a similar desire through protests that they are 
not “fourth instance” courts of appeal.91 Although understandable, this interpretation 
carries its own problems. The effect of Article 13.5(i), on this view, would be that 
tribunals are bound by domestic court decisions on domestic law matters. But situations 
                                                 
89 Report 260 (n 6) [5.3.1]. 
90 Report 260 appears to take a similar view: ibid [5.3.4]. 
91 See, eg, ADF Group Inc v USA (ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/1), Award, 9 January 2003 
[190]; Eli Lilly v Canada (UNCT/14/2), Final Award, 16 March 2017 [224]. 
may arise in which the investor might allege that host state courts are not to be trusted. 
Under the executive’s influence, local courts may issue a self-serving ruling that, for 
instance, a licence was lawfully terminated or that the investor acted illegally. If such 
problematic rulings are to bind tribunals, the security supposedly provided to the 
investor by the Model – of international oversight in a neutral forum – is largely lost. A 
better position, widely acknowledged amongst international courts, would be that, while 
international adjudicators must pay the utmost regard to domestic court rulings on 
domestic legal questions, exceptional circumstances may call for departure from this.92 
In any case, findings of a tribunal that “second-guess” the local courts on a domestic 
law question would not be binding on the host state,93 leaving the “fourth instance” 
situation to pose little risk to states. 
A third interpretation is also possible, illustrating further problems. India is a 
“dualist” state, in which breaches of the state’s international legal obligations cannot be 
directly pleaded before Indian courts.94 However, a partner state signing an investment 
treaty with India on the basis of the Model may be “monist”, allowing domestic courts 
(broadly speaking) to rule directly on alleged breaches of treaties binding on those 
states, without incorporation of the treaty into a domestic statute. In this situation, an 
Indian investor in such a host state will have possibly already pleaded a breach of the 
investment treaty before the host state’s domestic courts, and will have already lost its 
case before turning to international arbitration. If Article 13.5(i) binds the tribunal to the 
                                                 
92 See, eg, Helnan v Egypt (ICSID Case No ARB/05/19) Award, 3 July 2008 [106]; US – 
Section 301 Trade Act (22 December 2009) WT/DS152/R [7.19]; Kononov v Latvia App 
no 36376/04 (ECtHR, 17 May 2010) [189]; Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v Congo) 
[2010] ICJ Rep 639 [70] (ICJ). 
93 J Hepburn, Domestic Law in International Investment Arbitration (OUP 2017) 133–34. 
94 Constitution of India, Article 253; Jolly George Vergese v Bank of Cochin, 1980 AIR 470; 
State of West Bengal v Kesoram Industries (2004) 10 SCC 201. 
host state’s judicial determination of questions of international law – ie, whether the 
treaty has been breached – then the investor’s claim will necessarily fail. This would 
“render the entire BIT unworkable”.95 
The best interpretation of Article 13.5(i), then, is to view it as doing no more 
than (unnecessarily) replicating Articles 15.1 and 26.3, which already confirm that 
tribunals cannot make any principal findings on domestic law questions,96 but are 
restricted to determining whether the treaty itself has been breached – even if incidental 
findings on domestic law questions are required en route to this principal 
determination.97 Seen against the background operation of the international legal 
system, and the other obligations in the Model itself, Article 13.5(i) is simply redundant. 
4.2 Treaty conflict 
Under Article 34.2, questions regarding the Model’s relationship with other treaties are 
to be resolved by reference to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). 
As India is not a party to the VCLT, the Model drafters may have felt it necessary to 
include a provision specifically incorporating those rules to regulate any conflicts or 
inconsistencies between the Model and other treaties. However, the VCLT rules on 
                                                 
95 Report 260 (n 6) [5.3.2]. Report 260 considers a similar issue in relation to a different clause 
in the draft Model (Article 14.2(ii)(a), which was deleted in the Model), but ignores the 
possibility of a domestic court ruling on an international law question. The Report 
surprisingly accepts the Draft Model equivalent to the Model’s Article 13.5(i), finding it 
‘in consonance with ordinarily accepted tribunal jurisdictions’: ibid [5.3.4].  
96 cf JA Rivas in Brown (n 12) 235. 
97 J Hepburn, ‘CETA’s New Domestic Law Clause’ (EJIL:Talk!, 17 March 2016) 
<www.ejiltalk.org/cetas-new-domestic-law-clause/>. On incidental questions, see, eg,  
Ampal-American Israel Corp v Egypt (ICSID Case No ARB/12/11), Decision on Liability 
and Heads of Loss, 21 February 2017 [81]. 
treaty conflict reflect CIL.98 In particular, the VCLT’s Article 30(2), and its customary 
law equivalent, set out a kind of lex specialis rule, resolving treaty conflicts by giving 
effect to any specific intentions of the parties as manifested in a conflict clause in the 
treaty texts themselves.99 Even without Article 34.2, the customary rule would already 
regulate conflicts involving the Model.100 Application of the rule would draw on the 
Model’s Article 34.1, which contains a treaty conflicts clause establishing that the 
Model “shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties under any other 
Agreements to which they are parties”.101 An interpreter would thus conclude that any 
conflicting treaty should prevail over the Model. The presence of Article 34.2 in the 
Model does not cause any interpretive difficulties, but it adds nothing to the process or 
outcome of interpretation that would be followed in any case under CIL rules.102 
4.3 Burden of proof of international legal obligations 
Article 23.2 presents another instance of apparent redundancy, when measured against 
CIL requirements and other provisions of the Model. The article confirms the general 
position under international law that the party making an allegation bears the burden of 
                                                 
98 M Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Martinus 
Nijhoff 2009) 410; A Orakhelashvili, ‘Article 30’ in O Corten and P Klein (eds), The 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (OUP 2011) vol I, 774. 
99 Orakhelashvili (n 98) 764, 774.   
100 Article 23.3 explicitly gives power to tribunals to apply the customary rules of treaty 
interpretation. 
101 See also Article 32.3. 
102 Report 260 recommended replacing the reference to the VCLT with a reference to ‘rules of 
customary international law’: (n 6) [7.1.2]. This recommendation was apparently not 
accepted, but in any case the recommended clause would be as redundant as the original. 
proving that allegation (actori incumbit probatio),103 and unsurprisingly requires the 
investor to prove jurisdiction, breach, loss and causation. Curiously, though, Article 
23.2(b) also requires the investor to prove “the existence of an obligation under Chapter 
II of this Treaty”. Chapter II sets outs the central investment protections offered by the 
Model.  Presumably, an investor can satisfy its burden of proving the existence of a 
Chapter II obligation simply by pointing to the appropriate treaty clause; while the 
meaning or interpretation of the obligations might be in dispute, their existence is 
entirely obvious. 
Nevertheless, the Model drafters may have had in mind a scenario similar to the 
Agility v Pakistan case.104 The Agility claimants discontinued their case in August 2016, 
after conceding that they could not prove that the BIT underlying their claims had 
entered into force.105 Article 23.2(b) might be taken as a reminder to the investor that it 
must prove that the obligations claimed to be breached are, in fact, in force and binding 
on the host state. However, proof of this already forms part of proving jurisdiction, 
since the tribunal will not have jurisdiction if the underlying investment treaty is not in 
force. On this reading, the obligation in Article 23.2(b) is redundant, as it is already 
captured by Article 23.2(a). 
Alternatively, the Model drafters may have been thinking of a question raised 
relatively frequently in disputes under NAFTA and other US-model investment treaties. 
The NAFTA parties have often maintained, and NAFTA tribunals have often agreed, 
                                                 
103 See, eg, C Foster, ‘Burden of Proof in International Courts and Tribunals’ (2010) 29 
Australian YBIL 27, 35. 
104 Agility for Public Warehousing Company KSC v Pakistan (ICSID Case No ARB/11/8). 
105 LE Peterson, ‘After Obtaining a Jurisdictional Victory in 2013, Investor Later Concedes that 
Pakistani Investment Treaty is Not in Force and Drops its Arbitration’ (Investment 
Arbitration Reporter, 11 August 2016) <tinyurl.com/zmtpjsu>.  
that an investor-claimant must prove that an obligation which it contends to form part of 
the CIL minimum standard of treatment (MST) in NAFTA Article 1105 does in fact 
exist as part of that standard.106 Thus, rather than pertaining to the existence of treaty 
obligations, Article 23.2(b) perhaps reminds claimants that they need to prove the 
existence of CIL obligations.107 
But even this reading of Article 23.2(b) makes little sense. Unlike NAFTA and 
other US-model treaties, the Model does not refer to the “minimum standard of 
treatment”. Instead, Article 3.1 establishes an (apparently) exclusive list of four 
obligations that the Model takes to be prohibited by CIL, leaving no scope for an 
investor argue that other obligations also exist in CIL and are captured by Article 3.1.108 
As such, an investor would have little reason to argue for the existence of any particular 
customary obligation beyond those codified in Article 3.1. 
Article 23.2(b) thus constitutes another redundant provision in the Model, 
serving more to confuse the reader than to clarify the parties’ respective burdens of 
proof in investor-state arbitration. 
                                                 
106 See, eg, Glamis Gold v USA (UNCITRAL) Award, 8 June 2009 [600]–[601]; Cargill v 
Mexico (ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/05/2) Award, 18 September 2009 [273]; Eli Lilly v 
Canada (UNCT/14/2), Submission of the United States of America, 18 March 2016 [16]–
[17]. 
107 This view is supported in Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, 
Government of India, ‘Consolidated – Interpretative Statements’ 
<indiainbusiness.nic.in/newdesign/upload/Consolidated_Interpretive-Statement.pdf>, 
footnote 3.  
108 L Johnson, L Sachs and J Coleman, ‘International Investment Agreements, 2014: A Review 
of Trends and New Approaches’ in A Bjorklund (ed), Yearbook on International 
Investment Law & Policy 2014–2015 (OUP 2016) 29. 
4.4 References to the ICSID Convention 
The inclusion of a provision consenting to arbitration at the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) has been a mostly constant feature of 
India’s BITs since the conclusion of its very first treaty with the UK.109 Despite this, the 
Draft Model only made provision for arbitration to be conducted under the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules. Under the Model’s Article 16.1(a), India then reverted to offering 
consent to ICSID arbitration.110 However, for an ICSID arbitration to proceed, both the 
respondent state and the home state of the investor-claimant must be parties to the 
ICSID Convention.111 Since India is not yet a party, Article 16.1(a) (and its equivalent 
in most of the earlier treaties) might therefore appear surprising, as it will have no effect 
until India accedes to the Convention. 
This change from the Draft Model to the Model appears to be a result of the 
LCI’s recommendations in Report 260. The Report found the Draft Model’s restriction 
of the dispute resolution chapter to ad hoc UNCITRAL arbitration restrictive: 
Even though India is not a party to ICSID, reference to these alternate dispute 
resolution methods might benefit Indian investors abroad seeking to bring a claim 
against other States. Thus, by limiting the forum for dispute resolution, the 2015 
Model might deny available remedies to Indian investors abroad.112 
The LCI here appears to consider that India’s consent to ICSID arbitration in an 
investment treaty is sufficient to allow Indian nationals to commence arbitration under 
                                                 
109 India–UK BIT, Article 9(3)(a).  
110 See also Article 17.2. 
111 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States (adopted 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966) 575 UNTS 15, 
Article 25(1). 
112 Report 260 (n 6) [5.1.2]. 
the ICSID Convention. But this logic does not hold merit. As mentioned, arbitration 
under the ICSID Convention is only available to nationals of states that are party to the 
ICSID Convention,113 regardless of what arbitration options the state might consent to 
in an investment treaty. If the Model reverted to India’s previous position of consent to 
ICSID arbitration on the strength of the LCI’s recommendation, then, India will be 
disappointed to discover that the Model’s wording will bring no immediate benefits or 
additional remedies to Indian investors abroad. 
Alternatively, if the policy underpinning the inclusion of access to ICSID 
arbitration is for Indian investors to have recourse to ICSID’s institutional facilities, that 
objective is already met by the Model’s inclusion of the option to arbitrate under 
ICSID’s Additional Facility Rules.114 
Given India’s existing treaty commitments, Article 16.1(a) is also presently 
redundant. Nevertheless, consent to ICSID arbitration in the Model may serve as a 
hopeful signal to foreign investors that India is still contemplating a future accession to 
the ICSID Convention. At a practical level, offering consent to ICSID arbitration also 
avoids the need to amend investment treaties at the time of future accession to the 
Convention. 
5. Conclusion 
The problems with the Model identified in this article have significant consequences for 
the Model’s success. As the introduction noted, model BITs are intended to serve (at 
least) four purposes. Whether the Model is capable of achieving the first three of these 
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purposes – facilitating negotiations with partner states, constituting state practice which 
may contribute to the formation of CIL, and providing interpretive guidance to tribunals 
– depends on whether its text is clear. Given the criticisms identified particularly in 
Sections 3 and 4 above, it is doubtful that these three purposes will be met. The Model’s 
use will only hamper rather than facilitate negotiations if the meaning of its provisions 
and the intention behind them is not readily discernible. A basic statement of general 
negotiating positions on various issues is likely to be more useful than a poorly drafted 
model text. Similarly, unclear drafting and apparently redundant clauses are unlikely to 
form the basis of consistent state practice, and are also unlikely to provide any 
interpretive assistance to a tribunal. 
Meanwhile, it is still too early to tell whether the Model will serve the fourth 
purpose of promoting uniformity in international law, since this depends on whether the 
Model is agreed to by partner states. Although India has reportedly finalized treaties 
with Brazil and Cambodia partly on the basis of the Model,115 it is less clear that other 
states – notably including the United States – will support the Model’s innovations.116 
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The text’s uncertainties and redundancies further complicate the likelihood of partner 
state agreement. It must thus be questioned whether the Model can achieve any of its 
goals. 
This would not matter if India was preparing to renounce the investment treaty 
regime and pursue other methods for attracting foreign investment, as states such as 
South Africa and Indonesia have done. Certainly, economic evidence on the benefits of 
investment treaties for host states remains mixed.117 Even while pursuing wholesale 
termination of BITs, India has reportedly emerged as the fastest growing investment 
destination in 2016, alongside Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s drive to convince 
foreign corporations to “Make in India”.118 This perhaps suggests little need for BITs to 
encourage foreign investment in the state. Moreover, the limitations on sovereignty and 
risk of lawsuits entailed by investment treaties may well outweigh any benefits flowing 
from the additional protection for outward investors, as critics of the regime contend.119 
But India remains committed to the regime, and is in fact taking several bold 
steps to assert a role in the regime’s reformation. The Model itself represents an 
ambitious attempt to re-think the prevailing understanding of what an investment treaty 
looks like. In some areas, it may have even succeeded at this attempt. Following the 
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2016 BIT terminations, India has written to its partner states, and shifted the onus on 
them to come forward and negotiate new treaties with India.120 Some partners, such as 
the UK and Canada, appear keen to do so, at least in principle.121 At the same time, the 
country’s ever-growing numbers of outward investors have themselves begun to call on 
BIT protections,122 and likely form one element of India’s continued support for 
investment treaties. India therefore has reasons to hope that its Model will achieve its 
objectives. In turn, the Model’s failings therefore raise serious concerns about India’s 
ability to effectively renegotiate (terminated and future) BITs to its advantage. 
Apart from the instrumental, economic objectives of the Model, its potential to 
serve other symbolic objectives might also be noted. India presently shows some 
‘ambivalence about its place in the world’; ‘for the most part, [it is] a rule taker in 
international affairs’.123 The current re-shaping of international investment law has 
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Canada is also seeking an agreement, but reportedly wants concessions on certain 
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presented an opportunity for India to assert a greater role in international law more 
broadly, if it desires. Its size and growing economic power place it in a position of some 
(albeit complicated) influence, both regionally and amongst middle-income countries 
worldwide. India may not have had any such grand, general ambitions of international 
leadership in releasing the Model; it is more likely a ‘knee-jerk reaction’ to the claims 
by White Industries and others.124 But surely, at some level, the episode has encouraged 
India to think about what it wants from international law and how it wishes to position 
itself. In this sense, the Model’s flaws reflect a missed opportunity for India in the 
‘Asian century’. 
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